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I introduce a theoretical framework, due originally to Lewis and Skyrms, used in 
several talks in the PSA symposium "Signaling Within the Organism." I contrast 
sender-receiver systems as they appear within and between organisms, and as they 
function in the bridging of space and of time. Memory can be seen as the sending 
of messages over time, communication between an earlier and later self. I then 
compare psychological and genetic memory with respect to their relations to the 
sender-receiver model, arguing that some puzzles concerning genetic information 
can be resolved by seeing the genome as a cell-level memory with no sender. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Our understanding of meaning and representation is being transformed by new work that 
studies signaling games of the kind described by David Lewis, but treats them from an 
evolutionary point of view. This approach was introduced by Brian Skyrms in Evolution 
of the Social Contract (1995) and Signals (2010). 
 The basic case that the Lewis model covers is communication between two people 
or other organisms. But there are ways to recognize communication and signaling within 
an organism as well. This PSA session is about the application of sender-receiver models 
to these within-organism interactions. This paper will introduce the relevant models, 
discuss their within-organism application in general terms, and then discuss some specific 
cases and problems. 
 
2. Sender-Receiver Models 
Lewis (1969) wanted to understand "conventional" signaling. He did so like this. Imagine 
there are two rational agents. One is a "communicator" or (as I will say) sender who can 
see the state of the world but cannot act except to produce signals of some kind. The 
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"audience" or receiver can only see these signals, but can act in a way that affects them 
both. Lewis assumed common interest between the two agents: they have the same 
preferences for what they want done in each state of the world. Then if the sender sends 
distinctive signals in each state of the world, and the receiver uses these signals to prompt 
appropriate actions, such a "signaling system" can be a Nash equilibrium – neither side 
has any incentive to change (unilaterally) what they are doing.  
 More formally, the sender and receiver each follow or implement rules: fS for the 
sender and fR for the receiver. The sender's rule maps states of the world to signs; the 
receiver's rule maps signs to acts. Composed, the result is a function from states to acts, 
F, which may or may not correspond to the preferred mapping for both agents, F*.  
 
  fS : sender's rule, maps states of the world to signs. 
  fR : receiver's rule, maps signs to acts. 
 F :  the resulting mapping from states to acts. 
 F*: the mapping from states to acts preferred by both agents. 
 
Figure 1: Lewis Sender-Receiver Model 
 
This situation can be described as a division of labor: the sender acts as the receiver's 
eyes, the receiver acts as the sender's hands. Such a division of labor requires 
communication between the two sides, so signs appear in the middle. This set-up can also 
be seen as a solution to a particular kind of problem of control: pairing behavior usefully 
with states of the world, dealing with the environmental contingency of effective action.  
 Lewis assumed that the sender and receiver are rational agents linked by common 
knowledge. In his 1996 and 2010 books Skyrms gave an evolutionary, naturalistic 
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treatment of the Lewis model: rational choice was replaced by natural selection and also 
by simple forms of learning. Signaling systems can evolve and be evolutionarily stable.1 
 The Lewis model, as Skyrms emphasizes in Signals, has connections to 
information theory. When Shannon in 1948 gave a quantitative treatment of the 
transmission of information, he set out by imagining a transmitter and receiver, 
connected by a channel over which signals pass.  
 
 
 
Figure 2: Shannon's 1948 diagram of a "general communication system" 
 
He introduced measures of the amount of uncertainty associated with any variable – 
Shannon's entropy – and various measures of the degree of association between two 
variables – the extent to which the value of one variable predicts the value of the other. 
One of these measures is now called the mutual information.2  
 Shannon's model was set up by imagining something like a sender and a receiver, 
but those roles are not essential to his framework. Mutual information is ubiquitous in 
physical systems. The Lewis model, though, describes one way that it can come to exist: 
by the shaping of senders' behaviors. The sender is responsible for the informational 
relations between signs and states of the world, but the sender's payoffs, and hence their 
choices, are dependent on what the receiver does with those signals. Sender and receiver 
                                           
1  For an evolutionary treatment of the Lewis model see also Huttegger, Skyrms, Smead and 
Zollman (2010). For its philosophical significance see also Harms (2004). 
2  The Shannon entropy of a discrete random variable X which has possible values x1, x2, xi... is 
 
€ 
H(X) = − P(xi)Log2
i
∑ P(xi). The mutual information between two variables X and Y is 
H(X)+H(Y)–H(X,Y). Here H(X,Y) is the "joint entropy" of X and Y, which can be thought of as the 
entropy of the distribution of combinations of X and Y values.  
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behaviors co-evolve, and signs have their informational properties shaped as a 
consequence. When the sender's rule maps states to signs one-to-one, for example, the 
signs carry as much information about the world as is possible. But the sender will only 
perform such a mapping if the receiver will do something useful – from the sender's point 
of view – with the information supplied. If sender and receiver want different acts 
performed in each state of the world, then any information about the world contained in 
signals will be exploited by the receiver. Then the sender should stop sending informative 
signals and the receiver, in turn, should stop paying attention to them. 
 There are cases where information in a sign-like object is useable by a receiver 
without a sender being involved at all. These include what biologists call "cues" – unsent 
or naturally occurring signs. Using clouds as a sign of the weather is an example. From 
the point of view of the model, these are cases where the production process behind a 
sign is unaffected by feedback from the sign's use and its consequences. The same might 
apply on the receiver side. It appears that in cases where there is no sender shaping the 
signs in a way affected by the receiver's actions, there is no way for cues to become 
complicated and elaborate. Complexity in signs cannot accumulate by a selection 
process. This does not limit the usefulness of cues, if a reader is smart enough. A smart 
reader can infer a vast amount from traces that are left fortuitously. (Consider Laplace's 
demon.) But this requires powerful inferential capacities; it cannot be done by a simple, 
mechanical reader device.  
 Sender-receiver set-ups arise in a wide range of contexts. At least three kinds of 
generality can be distinguished. First, the model can be applied to signaling between and 
within organisms. Second, different selection processes operating on various time-scales 
can shape sender and receiver behaviors, including evolution by natural selection, 
reinforcement learning, differential imitation, and deliberate choice. Third, signs can be 
used by senders and receivers to bridge both space and time. This gives the model a 
connection to memory, both in psychological and other forms. 
 There is a separate question about how broadly the Lewis model applies. As 
discussed above, the relations between a Lewisian sender and receiver enable the solution 
of a particular problem of control. Effective pairing of actions with states of the world is 
achieved by the sender tracking those states making information about them available to 
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the receiver. Consider, in contrast, a "cox" in a boat calling the stroke for two rowers. The 
sender has no private knowledge, and the point of the calling is purely to coordinate the 
actions of the rowers. It does not matter when they row, as long as they row at the same 
time. (The cox is like a "central pattern generator" in the brain.) This purely coordinative 
signaling does not fit the Lewis model.3 There are also mixed cases. If instead of a cox, 
one of the rowers calls the stroke, then he may have private knowledge – of the timing of 
his upcoming stroke – and formally the Lewis model can be applied, by treating the 
sender's intention to row as a "state."4 The question arises whether this assimilation 
obscures the fact that the function of the call is the same in the coxless case and the case 
with the cox – the function is coordination of actions – and the fact that coordinative and 
fact-tracking signaling are distinct activities, though they may also appear in 
combinations. 
 However those issues are handled, the model brings with it a particular orientation 
to questions involving signs: focus on the shaping and stabilization of sender and receiver 
behaviors, rather than on peculiar properties of the mediating entities themselves. Here 
"senders and receivers" include writers and readers, producers and consumers (Millikan 
1984), inscribers and interpreters, publishers and subscribers, of many kinds. As Lewis 
said in 1969, if you know what the sending and interpreting rules are and why they are 
the way they are, nothing has been left out of an understanding of the semantic properties 
of signs in that system. The way to understand sign-related phenomena is to investigate 
the co-evolution of sender and receiver behavior, the two-sided phenomenon of sign use.  
 This session is concerned with a particular slice of the total set of phenomena to 
which the framework can be applied: signaling within the organism. 
 
3. Representation and Memory  
A sender-receiver set-up of the Lewisian kind solves a particular problem of control: 
coordinating actions with states of the world. If one part of a system is receptive and 
another part can act, and there is a high degree of common interest, signaling can be used 
to solve the problem of determining how to act. This distinction between roles can be 
                                           
3  For material in this paragraph I am indebted to Kevin Zollman (in discussion). 
4  I say "may" because the caller might be such that their call prompts their own stroke, rather 
than reflecting the antecedent fact of their intention. 
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applied to the control of behavior by an organism. Both the problem and the solution can 
be laid out in two dimensions, in fact. First, the relevant divide is seen in the relation 
between an organism's senses and effectors (as discussed in Cailin O'Connor's talk at the 
2012 PSA meeting).5 Here signaling overcomes a spatial divide. Second, the division is 
present over time. Present selves have access to information that will be useful to the 
guidance of action by future selves, so present selves lay down marks that can be 
consulted later. Memory is sending messages over time. 
 The set-up characterized by the sender-receiver model appears in both clear, 
paradigm forms and in partial, marginal, or semi-submerged cases. In different contexts 
different kinds of partial cases arise. In the between-organism case, complications and 
non-Lewisian phenomena arise especially from the divergent interests and multifarious 
agendas of communicating agents. Where interests diverge, there may be a refusal to 
send informative signs, also cycles and chaotic dynamics (Wagner 2011). 
 In the within-organism case, common interest is not as much of an issue, though 
there are exceptions.6 Complications arise especially from the entanglement of roles that 
are treated as distinct in the model. The sensorimotor axis of an organism can be seen as a 
realization of a sender-receiver structure in at least a rough way: the problem of 
coordinating acts with the world is being solved by coordinating receptive and active 
parts of the organism. But except in very simple and perhaps very modular cases, there is 
poor separation between sender and sign; there is a network of downstream processes 
each of which makes use of the activity of those upstream. The same applies, though 
more controversially, in the temporal dimension. One way for memory to operate, and a 
way that makes it a clear case of the sender-receiver set-up, is for it to have a write-read 
structure. This is seen in a Turing machine, for example, where marks are first made on, 
and later read from, a tape. This is also familiar from the use of external mnemonic tools 
such as notes and diaries. Many neuroscientists make a point of claiming that this is not 
how memory works in the brain, however. Christof Koch (1999) says: "memory is 
everywhere, intermixed with computational elements." Some disagree with this; Randy 
Gallistel and Adam King (2010) have argued that given what brains can evidently do, 
                                           
5  See O'Connor's paper “Evolving to Categorize.” 
6  Exceptions are discussed in Godfrey-Smith (forthcoming). 
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they must contain an "addressable read/write memory," one that is more like computer 
memory. John Donohoe, a defender of the orthodox view, wrote a review of Gallistel and 
King in which he said that what has been learned is that the brain in fact contains a 
"write-only" memory system (2010). Gallistel replied that if the brain wrote something 
but could not read it, that would surely be pointless. Donohoe's view might be better 
expressed by saying that what we have learned – according to mainstream views – is that 
the brain contains a write-activate memory. Evolved neural machinery has the function of 
introducing marks or traces into the brain as a result of experience, where these marks 
usefully affect later behavior, but the marks have these effects without being read. From 
the point of view of the sender-receiver model, this is a debate about whether neural 
memory is a clear realization of a sender-receiver structure or a more partial, washed-out 
one, because the entanglement of the roles of sign and sign user.  
 
4. Genetic Memory 
In the rest of this paper I will apply these ideas to a special case. Informational and 
communication-related concepts have become important parts of modern biology, 
especially the description of gene action. The status of these descriptions has been much 
debated. Some recent work has cast the problem within a sender-receiver model, or a 
relative of it. I have in mind papers by Nicholas Shea (2007, 2012) and by Carl 
Bergstrom and Martin Rosvall (2009). I have discussed their proposals elsewhere.7 Here I 
will sketch a different view. 
 The best justification for a view of gene action that takes concepts of coding and 
representation (etc.) seriously is the reality of the reader step. Genes have a rather clear 
reader mechanism, the transcriptional and translational machinery. The rest of the story is 
not so clear. One way the informational view of genes has been discussed from time to 
time, mixed in with other ways, is with the idea of memory. David Nanney, in 1958, used 
an analogy with a library. He said there are two tasks that cells manage to perform: 
 
                                           
7  For discussion of Shea see Godfrey-Smith and Sterelny (2007), for discussion of Bergstrom and 
Rosvall see Godfrey-Smith (2011). For further discussion of this problem see Griffiths (2000) 
and Godfrey-Smith (2000),  
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On the one hand, the maintenance of a "library of specificities," both expressed 
and unexpressed, is accomplished by a template replicating mechanism. On the 
other hand, auxiliary mechanisms with different principles of operation are 
involved in determining which specificities are to be expressed in any particular 
cell. … [These] will be referred to as "genetic systems" and "epigenetic systems." 
(1958, p. 712) 
 
I think this is a helpful way of looking at the situation, now as well as then. A genome 
can be seen as containing a memory of the structure of useful protein molecules. This is 
not the only thing a genome does, as it also participates in the regulation of its own 
expression, but the memory role is one role. Specifically, though, the genome is a cell-
level memory. The reading process that the genome is involved with is an intra-cellular 
process, and the result of the reading is production of a protein molecule. Cells read their 
genes, and cells persist and divide, carrying their internal library with them. Organisms 
are the results, the upshots, of what the cells are doing. 
 If that is the reader, who is the writer? Which sender's activities make it the case 
that the cells contain DNA sequences worth reading? The short answer is that there is no 
sender. 
 There is a temptation to look automatically for a sender as complement to any 
receiver. As noted earlier in this paper, that is not always how things are. Unsent signs or 
cues can be useable. But in general, I said, without a choosing, evolving, or learning 
sender there is no way for a complicated and elaborate message worth reading to arise. 
More exactly, the relationship that is relevant here is one between sign complexity and 
reader complexity. All events leave traces that a smart reader can make use of by 
inference, and this can include traces that are very complicated. For simpler, mechanical 
readers, however, the only unsent "messages" (scare-quotes because these are really just 
cues) worth reading are simple ones. Turning again to genes, we find that the system of 
gene expression involves a simple, mechanical reader, and what it reads is complicated. 
So, Shea and Bergstrom and Rosvall might then argue, the good design and the the 
amount of useful information in DNA shows that it was made for an information-carrying 
role and its messages do have a sender. Perhaps the sender is the previous generation. 
 But DNA is a special case, which falls outside the application of this argument, 
because of its place within the evolutionary process. DNA's evolutionary embedding 
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makes it an unsent sign, something worth reading without having being written, even 
though it is very complex.  
 The evolutionary process shapes the genetic sequences that are around at any 
time. Evolution itself is not a sender, it is just something that happens. Mutations happen; 
differential survival and reproduction happen. As a result of how they happen, DNA 
sequences are made into libraries of useful specificities, and also into components in 
control systems that regulate how the library is accessed. Rather than a write-read 
memory system, genetic memory systems are an evolve-read system. The retention of 
information, especially across cell division, is an adapted process, but its inscription is 
not.8  
 If so, the contrasts with a paradigm sender-receiver system that are seen in 
psychological memory – according to mainstream neuroscience – and in genes, can be 
represented as in Figure 3: 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Contrasts between the paradigm sender-receiver set-up and two empirical cases 
 
 If this view is right, DNA does not contain a message of the kind seen in signs 
that have co-adapted senders and receivers. It is a special case of a "cue," in the 
                                           
8  In contrast, epigenetic systems, which function as shorter-term memory, do have producers, 
inscribers, senders, as well as evolved mechanisms for retention. I hope to discuss this 
comparison in detail in another paper. 
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biologist's sense, an unsent sign. But it is still possible to ask what is being read from it; 
what sort of involvement of the DNA sequence with something external to it makes the 
"message" worth reading? Something like the same distinction between fact-tracking and 
purely coordinative roles for signs, introduced in Section 2, can be applied here again, 
and some interesting questions arise which I will only briefly sketch. Dawkins (1998) 
suggests that our genomes contain a description or model of ancestral worlds. He 
compares the long-term population-wide representation of the world in our genes with the 
short-term one that each individual generates in their brain as they live their life. If I am 
right, then although idea of memory is indeed applicable in both contexts, the details 
differ from Dawkins' account on two counts. First, there is no genetic representation that 
is made, sent, or inscribed. The evolutionary process gives rise to genomes worth 
reading, but no one writes them down. Second, the kind of message-like features that the 
genome has are not analogous to a representation of how things are, but a representation 
of what to make, what to do. This is akin to the purely coordinative role for signaling, 
more like the remembering of a routine or a song, remembering what to make and how to 
be. There are connections here to analyses of the content of DNA messages that see this 
content as imperative rather than indicative (Stegmann 2005), and also, given the 
unwritten nature of the genetic message, to "fictionalist" analyses of genetic information 
(Levy 2011).  
 
*       *       * 
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